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CONSUMER BEHAVIOR AND THE SAFETY
EFFECTS OF PRODUCT SAFETY
REGULATION*
W. KIP VISCUSI
Duke University

I.

A

INTRODUCTION

recurring issue in the economic analysis of risk regulation agencies is

whether these efforts have had any significant favorable effect on safety.
Although the existence of such an effect would not necessarily imply that

these efforts were worthwhile, without an enhancement in safety there is
no potential rationale for these regulations.
Most of the research to date has focused on auto accidents and job

risks. Motor-vehicle accidents pose the chief safety risk, accounting for
one-half of all accidental fatalities.' Studies of the safety-enhancing ef-

fects of seat belts have, however, failed to indicate any clear-cut
beneficial effect of this safety measure on auto fatality rates. 2 One contributor to their ineffectiveness is that drivers will reduce the degree to
which they exercise care as their safety protection from seat belts and
other protective features increases, thus dampening and possibly even
offsetting the safety improvements from seat belts.
The studies of job safety have placed less emphasis on the role of

individual behavior, not because worker actions are unimportant, but
because Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regula* This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant SES
8218058. William Evans provided excellent research assistance. Jennie Spadafora and David
Brancato were especially helpful in providing me with unpublished accident and poisoning
data. Instructive comments were provided by Dennis Carlton and members of the University of Chicago Industrial Organization Workshop.
' National Safety Council, Accident Facts 13 (1982).
2 See, in particular, Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J.
Pol. Econ. 677 (1975); Glenn Blomquist, The Regulation of Highway Traffic Safety (manuscript) (forthcoming, Am. Enterprise Inst.), and Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham,
Automobile Safety Regulation and Offsetting Behavior: Some New Empirical Estimates, 74
Am. Econ. Rev. 328 (1984).
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXVIII (October 1985)]
© 1985 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-2186/85/2803-0004$01.50

HeinOnline -- 28 J.L. & Econ. 527 1985

THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

tions have not been particularly effective in altering firms' incentives to
invest in safety. Noncompliance with OSHA regulations is quite frequent,
in large part because the expected penalties for noncompliance are negligible and the costs that must be incurred to achieve compliance are considerable. The net effect is that there is no evidence of a significant effect
3
on safety.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) represents an intermediate case in terms of the level of the risks possibly affected by agency
actions. Roughly 30 percent of all home accident deaths are product related, which is almost double the risk level from work accidents and just
over half that of motor-vehicle accidents. 4 Although some products (for
example, boats) have been specifically excluded from the CPSC's jurisdiction, the agency has broad authority over a wide range of consumer
products.
This scope derives from the historical role of the CPSC, an independent
regulatory commission established in 1972 (and first operating in 1973) in
order to consolidate the product safety functions scattered throughout the
federal government. The CPSC inherited the functions of the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act (formerly administered by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, the Department of Commerce, and the
Federal Trade Commission), the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970
(formerly administered by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare), and the Refrigerator Safety Act (formerly administered by the
Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission). Congress
also gave the CPSC broad authority to set standards to eliminate "unreasonable" risks and to issue bans and recalls of products that violate
CPSC standards or that create "a substantial risk of injury to the con5
sumer."
Notwithstanding the potential importance of the CPSC, there has been
very little systematic scrutiny of its efforts. Published studies have addressed the limitations of its product safety data base and one particular
standard-the mattress flammability standard-but there has been no
comprehensive empirical assessment of the agency. 6 This paper is in' For a review of the role of worker actions and a general assessment of the impact of
OSHA, see W. Kip Viscusi, Risk by Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Workplace
(1983).
' The 30 percent figure is based on the CPSC's estimate that 30,000 consumers are killed
annually using consumer products, in conjunction with data on an overall accidental death
level of 99,000 in 1981.
' See the Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. 92-573, § 2(a) and § 15(a), 86 Stat. 1207,
1221 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2064(a) (1982)).
6 Two principal published studies are V. K. Broussalian, Risk Measurement and Safety
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tended to provide a detailed empirical assessment of the effect of CPSC
regulations on product safety. 7
Section II begins with a review of the principal home accident data
series, for which I will test whether there has been any shift in accident
trends as a result of the CPSC's efforts. These aggregative statistics do
not suggest any statistically significant effects, a finding that is similar to
the results of analyses of other risk regulation agencies. Section III presents the principal case study-the effect of protective bottle caps on
poisonings. The implications of this regulation are strongly related to
consumers' behavioral response to safety caps. The strength of this behavioral response and the detailed information available regarding poisonings make this a particularly instructive case study of consumers' response to regulatory protection. A series of other CPSC regulations are
reviewed in Section IV in order to ascertain whether there may be some
beneficial product-specific effects that are not apparent in the aggregative
data or in the poisoning trends. These data provide no evidence of any
significant beneficial impacts on product safety.
IL.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE

CPSC

The two principal policy mechanisms the CPSC has for influencing
product safety are issuing standards and banning or recalling hazardous
products. The standard-setting activities have been comparatively modest. The CPSC has issued just over twenty standards pertaining to a
variety of products: lawn mowers, matchbooks, baby cribs, bicycles, and
children's sleepwear. Many of its efforts have focused on banning or
recalling hazardous products, in part because this policy approach does
not require that the CPSC go through the rule-making process. Recent
CPSC ban and recall actions have addressed a wide variety of products,
including refuse bins, asbestos-containing hairdryers, roller skates, electric drills, motorcycles, scuba diving equipment, and thermostats.
In each case, the CPSC does not encounter the same types of enforcement problems as does OSHA since it can typically monitor a small
number of units in a standardized product line to ascertain whether firms
are in compliance. For example, a single trip to a drugstore will provide
very detailed information about whether drug companies are in compliance with CPSC safety cap requirements, whereas ascertaining compliance with an OSHA chemical exposure standard will require visits to
Standards in Consumer Products, in Household Production and Consumption 491 (N. Terleckyj ed. 1976); and W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating Consumer Product Safety (1984).
7 See Viscusi, supra note 6, for a more extensive and less technical assessment of CPSC
that complements the material presented here.
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TABLE I
THE TEN PRODUCTS MOST INVOLVED IN INJURIES,

1981
Injuries
(in Thousands)

Product Group
Stairs, steps, ramps, and landings
Bicycles and bicycle accessories
Baseball
Football
Basketball
Nails, carpet tacks, screws, and thumbtacks
Chairs, sofas, and sofa beds
Skating
Nonglass tables
Glass doors, windows, and panels

763
518
478
470
434
244
236
225
225
208

SOURCE.-U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Annual Report 22 (1982).

possibly thousands of workplaces using the chemical. The general consensus, including the opinion of the CPSC, is that there is a high degree of
compliance with CPSC requirements. 8
Even if fully effective, however, the CPSC regulations may not have a
major effect on safety. The scope of the CPSC actions is quite modest;
OSHA, for example, has promulgated over 200 times as many standards
as has the CPSC. In addition, the bulk of the product risk problem cannot
be eliminated without major changes in our life-styles. Table I lists the ten
most hazardous product groups, based on the CPSC's hospital emergency
room admission data. Falls down various types of stairs and ramps head
the list but are not covered by CPSC policies because of the decentralized
nature of the use of this product. The CPSC could, however, establish a
stair width and handrail requirement, if it chose to do so. The second
leading cause of accidents-riding bicycles-is already the subject of
CPSC regulations, which, except for a reflector requirement, seem to bear
a tenuous relationship to bike safety. Four of the other ten riskiest "products" are also sports-related activities-baseball, football, basketball,
and skating. The potential impact of any CPSC regulation on these risks is
likely to be negligible. The risk of being cut by a nail or a thumbtack
likewise will remain so long as such products are in use.
The three remaining product risk categories are potentially more subject to the influence of CPSC policies. The CPSC has in place flammability
requirements for chairs and sofas. Similarly, glass doors and windows are
at least partially regulated through architectural glazing requirements for
glass doors. Finally, nonglass tables could conceivably be regulated by,
for example, prohibiting the presence of sharp corners and requiring
This evidence is reviewed in id.
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TABLE 2
ACCIDENTAL DEATH RATES

(Rates per 100,000 Population)

Year

Home

Poisonings
(under Five)

Fires and Burns
(under Five)

Ingestions
(under Five)

1935
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980

25.2
23.9
19.2
15.6
13.2
10.1

5.4
5.0
2.5
2.2
1.3
.4

17.9
14.8
8.1
7.3
4.8
4.2

...
6.6
7.0
5.2
2.7

SOURcE.-National Safety Council, Accident Facts (1982).

rounded edges on furniture, but no such regulation now exists and would
be of questionable merit. The impact of current CPSC regulations is likely
to be quite small, and even if the agency were much more active than it
now is, it is doubtful whether there would be a dramatic impact on product safety.
The absence of any stark shift in product safety after the advent of the
CPSC is borne out by the accident trend data in Table 2. Fatal home
accident rates dropped from 13.2 per 100,000 to 10.1 per 100,000 during
the 1970s, but this change appears to represent a continuation in the
downward accident trend that has prevailed throughout this century. As
society has become richer, safety levels of all kinds have increased because of the positive income elasticity of demand for good health. The
three specific accident rate series listed-poisonings, fires and burns, and
ingestions-likewise have been affected by a downward trend from increasing social wealth. Since some of these component risks are strongly
related to age, each of the specific risk series is for the population under
five years of age, which is a high-risk group.
The first risk series I will analyze is the overall home accident rate
(HR). These statistics are based on National Center for Health Statistics
accident reports. Although data have been collected by this organization
on a continuous basis for over fifty years, there have been some changes
over time because of periodic changes in the international classification of
diseases. These changes in disease categorization primarily affect illnesses rather than accidents. 9 Previous classification periods will be cap' In particular, in the case of the ninth revision, which occurred in 1976, there was an
effect of the coding system of less than 2 percent on all accidents other than those related to
motor vehicles. The 1976 shift will be adjusted for explicitly using comparability ratios
developed by the National Center for Health Statistics. See the National Center for Health
Statistics, Estimates of Selected Comparability Ratios Based on Dual Coding of 1976 Death
Certificates by the Eighth and Ninth Revisions of the International Classification of Diseases, 28 Monthly Vital Statis. Rep. (February 29, 1980).
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tured through a series of dummy variables (D1, D2, D3, and D4) that take
on a value of one during a particular classification period and zero otherwise.
The two time periods to be analyzed will be 1933-81 and 1949-81. The
1933 starting period was selected both to avoid the complicating influence
of the depression and to have a comparable starting date for all major
accident series, some of which are unavailable before that date. The 1949
starting date is for a post-World War II analysis, which may better reflect
current behavior to the extent that the home accident rate relationships
have not been stable over the past fifty years. I selected 1949 as the
starting point since a new revision in the classification system began in
that year.
The first substantive explanatory variable included was the lagged
value of the home accident rate (HR, 1). The linear form of the accident
probability was used largely to provide greater ease in interpreting the
results. To take into account the constrained nature of the dependent
variable, one could use the logarithm of the accident rate as in Peltzman
or the log odds of the accident rate as in Viscusi.' 0 The regression results
with respect to the impact of CPSC were quite robust with respect to such
changes in specification."
Since consumer safety will be affected not only by current products but
also by the stock of existing products and their manner of use, HR,_
should have a positive effect on HR. Lagged dependent variables play a
fundamental role in most accident rate equations in the literature, and in
this instance omission of the HR, I variable will generate serial correlation problems.
The second principal variable is the value of real per capita consumption (PCC). This variable is intended to capture the effect of rising consumer wealth, which should have a negative effect on accidents to the
extent that rising wealth leads to a greater demand for safety. There may,
however, be other effects of PCC other than a pure income effect. Increased wealth may increase the volume of consumer product purchases
and the nature of the product mix. For example, it may lead to increased
use of pharmaceutical products which will then increase the risk of

10 See Peltzman, supra note 2; and W. Kip Viscusi, The Impact of Occupational Safety
and Health Regulation, 10 Bell J. Econ. 117 (1979).
" Other specifications of the dependent variable included the log-odds, logarithm, and
percentage change in the death risk (without a lagged dependent variable). The results were
very similar. For example, the CPSC variable in the natural log specification of the analog of
the equation for the entire population for 1950-81 (see Table 3) had a t-statistic of - 1.15,
which is marginally different from the value of -0.90 for the linear probability version.
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poisoning to one's children. From a theoretical standpoint, the predicted
sign of PCC is not clear.
The fundamental variable of interest is CPSC, which is a regulatory
dummy variable that takes on a value of one during the 1973-81 period
and zero otherwise. This variable is intended to capture any shift in the
intercept term as a result of CPSC. Finally, the equations for the entire
sample included a variable that would reflect the demographic composition, in particular, the percentage of children in the population who are
under age five (%UNDER5). This group is a particularly high-risk segment of the population for poisonings, ingestions, and fire and burn
deaths.
Since it is not feasible to include all the diverse factors affecting product
safety, the empirical analysis focuses on what might best be viewed as a
reduced form model of a complex accident-generating process. For the
full sample, the equation to be estimated is

HR, = a + 13HR,-, + 132PCC
+

135D1

+

133CPSC + 134%UNDER5

+

136D2 + 137 D3

+

(1)

P3
8 D 4 +u.()

The DI and D2 terms are omitted for regressions over time periods in
which these periods of illness classification are not relevant. The expected
signs of the key variables are positive for 13,, negative or conceivably
positive for 132, negative for 133, and positive for 134.
Table 3 summarizes the home accident rate regression results for both
time periods. For each equation, I also report the Durbin-Watson statistics. ' 2 Here and throughout the rest of the paper there is no firm evidence
of serial correlation.
The lagged home accident rate has a consistently positive effect on
accidents, as we would expect. The effect is especially pronounced during
the post-World War II period. Over the past few decades, over half the
value of HR,_I is transmitted in the subsequent year to influence HR,.
There is consequently a strong intertemporal linkage in the accidentgenerating process.
Real per capita consumption has a significant negative effect on home
accident rates, which suggests that the wealth effect dominates any possible increase in risk from the greater level of consumption by wealthier
consumers. The importance of this time trend was not sensitive to the
particular measure used. Similar results were obtained using either a simple time trend variable or real per capita income instead of PCC.
12 Although the Durbin h-statistic is more appropriate when a lagged dependent variable
is included, it has similar small sample properties. In addition, this statistic was undefined
for many regressions, including all of those in Table 9.
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TABLE 3
HOME ACCIDENT RATE REGRESSION RESULTS

COEFFICIENTS AND
STANDARD ERRORS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

1933-81

1949-81

Intercept

17.49
(4.17)
.277
(.104)
- .003
(.001)
.087
(.684)
14.66
(25.53)
4.26
(1.72)
3.90
(1.36)
.428
(1.097)
- .631
(.825)
.97
1.85

17.79
(9.96)
.548
(.174)
- .002
(.001)
- .333
(.370)
-53.80
(41.94)

HR,-,
PCC
CPSC
%UNDER5
DI
D2
D3
D4
2

R
D-W

1.309
(.734)
.777
(.525)
.97
1.97

The CPSC regulation variable is never statistically significant and never
has a t-statistic above 0.9. In the home accident data there is no evidence
of a post-CPSC downward shift in the intercept term. The largest point
estimate of an impact of the CPSC is in the equation for 1949-81. Taken at
face value this coefficient implies a mean effect that is almost 4 percent of
the 1981 home accident rate, which would have been 9.5 deaths per
100,000 rather than 9.2 if the CPSC had not been in existence. Since we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is significantly different
from zero, what this result suggests is that if there is a nonzero effect, it is
likely to be small. Indeed, the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence
interval suggests an impact of just under 1.0 deaths per 100,000, or less
than a 10 percent reduction in the home accident rate.
The principal variables influencing consumer safety are not CPSC, but
HRt I and PCC. The age composition variable (%UNDER5) and the
disease classification dummy variables were not statistically significant
except in the pre-World War II data (D1 and D2).
One obtains similar results in an analysis of the principal accident categories that make up the overall accident rate, as reported in Table 4. Here
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TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF

CPSC

EFFECTS ON POISONING, BURN, AND INGESTION DEATH RATES

COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS FOR CPSC VARIABLES

1933-81
and 1941-81 (Ingestions)
ACCIDENT

TYPE

Poisonings
Burns
Ingestions

1949-81

Entire
Population

Population
under Five

Entire
Population

Population
under Five

.054
(.155)
-. 136
(.414)
.074
(.082)

.209
(.201)
1.286
(.744)
.340
(.604)

.191
(.181)
-. 193
(.463)
.052
(.107)

- .054
(.107)
.171
(.467)
.988
(.614)

I will focus on the three accident classes most directly affected by CPSC
regulations-poisonings, fires and burns, and ingestions. In each case the
equations estimated were of the same general form as equation (1). The
only difference was with respect to the starting point of the CPSC dummy
variable, which was adjusted so as to pertain to the regulations likely to
affect that risk class.
A leading target of CPSC actions has been poisonings of children. In
order to reduce these hazards, Congress passed the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act of 1970. Beginning in 1972, aspirin, controlled drugs, and
furniture polishes were subject to a protective packaging requirement.
Additional products were added to this list in the subsequent decade.
Since these packaging requirements are among the most extensive and
well known CPSC regulations, it is instructive to ascertain whether they
had any effect on the poisoning death rate. The particular CPSC variable
used took a value of one beginning in 1972. As the CPSC coefficients in
Table 4 indicate, there was no downward shift in poisoning deaths in the
1972-81 period. Even more disturbing is that in the two cases in which the
coefficients exceeded the standard errors, the effects are positive. While
not statistically significant at the usual levels, these effects may be a signal
of a possible positive upward shift in subcategories of poisoning rates.
This possibility will be explored in Section III.
The next accident category, fire and burn deaths, has been the target of
a wide variety of CPSC standards. Most of these efforts have been concerned with flammability requirements instituted in response to the Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953. The pivotal year in the CPSC.'s regulation of
these hazards was 1975, in which it instituted regulations for carpets and
rugs, children's sleepwear, and clothing textiles, and set final mattress
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TABLE 5
ACTUAL AND PREDICTED FIRE-RELATED DEATHS,

1974-78

FIRE-RELATED DEATH RATE PER 100,000
YEAR

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
Average for regulated period

Actual

Predicted

.65
.63
.65
.63
.58
.62

...

.65
.61
.59
.56
.60

Difference
-. 02
.04
.04
.02
.02

SOURCE.-CPSC's NEISS data and calculations by the author.

flammability requirements (for which regulation began in 1973).13 Some of
these regulations have been major sources of controversy. The flammability requirements for children's sleepwear led to use of the flame retardant
Tris, which was subsequently found to be potentially carcinogenic. The
beneficial safety effects of these regulations have also come under question; Linneman, for one, was unable to find any significant effect of the
CPSC mattress standard on mattress-related burns. 4
The results on the second line of Table 4 also fail to suggest any downward shift in fire and burn deaths over the primary period for which the
CPSC regulated such risks. The most pertinent results are for the population under five, where these coefficients are positive. The positive CPSC
variable is only significant (at the 5 percent level, one tailed test) in the
case of the 1933-81 data, a result that may be due to the inability of this
equation adequately to capture the nature of more recent experience. The
positive CPSC effect is much smaller in magnitude and not significantly
different from zero in the more recent results, which suggests that the
burn-related regulations had no significant effect.
Similar results for fire and burn deaths (BR,) are borne out by the data
gathered through the CPSC's National Electronic Injury Surveillance
System (NEISS) based on reports from selected hospitals. The actual
level of fire-related deaths per 100,000 persons declined somewhat from
the 1974-78 period, as shown in Table 5. Using the overall NSC fire and
burn death equation estimated in Table 4 for the 1950-81 period, one can
calculate the predicted death-rate level by adjusting the NSC equation by
the ratio of the NEISS burn rate in 1974 to the 1974 NSC burn rate to put
13 One obtains similar results using a 1973-81 dummy variable for CPSC rather than a
1975-81 variable.
14 Peter Linneman, The Effects of Consumer Safety Standards: The 1973 Mattress Flammability Standard, 23 J. Law & Econ. 461 (1980).
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them on a comparable basis. More specifically, if we let
BR 74 (NEISS)
BR 7 4 (NSC)

the estimated level of NEISS burn rates is kBR,(NSC), where BR, is the
estimated burn rate from the burn rate analog of equation (1). Actual
NEISS burn rates after the regulation average slightly above their predicted levels, but by an insignificant amount (under half the standard error
of the predicted value).
The final accident category considered was ingestions of objects. The
CPSC has attempted to address this risk by imposing minimum size requirements on pacifiers (1977), rattles (1978), and toys (1979). All toys
intended for use by children under the age of three must be sufficiently
large so as not to fit within a cylinder that is 1.25 inches in diameter and
2.25 inches high.' 5 The initial year 1977 was selected as the starting point
for the regulatory shift variable, but similar results were obtained using
1978 and 1979. In all cases the CPSC variable is not significantly different
from zero.
In terms of overall impact, the CPSC bears many similarities to other
risk regulation agencies. There is no evidence in the aggregative data of
any beneficial effect on product safety. In the case of poisonings, the
results suggest that there may even be a possible adverse effect. Whether
or not this is the case is the focus of the next section.
III.
A.

SAFETY CAPS AND POISONINGS

Conceptual Foundations

One CPSC regulation familiar to all consumers is the protective bottle
cap requirements. Congress passed the Poison Prevention Packaging Act
of 1970 to address the problem of accidental poisonings that primarily
involved young children under the age of five. This cause of accidents had
gained increasing attention throughout the 1960s, in large part because
increases in the percentage of the population in this group boosted the
total number of poisonings. Although the poisoning rate occasionally increased as well, the dominant long-run trend in the frequency of poisonings was in the downward direction, as the fatal poisoning rate for children under five dropped from 2.52 per million in 1950 to 2.19 per million in
1960, and to 1.32 per million in 1970.16
'5

C.F.R. § 1501.4 (1979).

6 All overall poisoning rate data cited in this section are based on unpublished Poison

Control Center computer printouts prepared for this study. Poisoning death data are based
on unpublished National Center for Health Statistics data.
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The poisoning problem, which typically involves nonfatal outcomes,
had shown signs of diminishing even more rapidly than before. This improvement may be attributable in part to a series of efforts directed at
reducing poisonings. In the mid-1960s firms limited the number of tablets
per bottle, placed warning labels on the bottles, replaced screw caps with
snap caps, and in some cases voluntarily introduced safety caps. Perhaps
even more important, there was a widespread educational campaign to
urge parents to limit their children's access to drugs. The regulation variable used below will not capture these influences, some of which may
have been undertaken in anticipation of regulation.
These efforts were augmented by explicit government regulation beginning in 1972 when the FDA required protective bottle caps on aspirin,
furniture polishes, methyl salicylate, and several controlled drugs. The
scope of product coverage was subsequently expanded to include turpentine (1973), oral prescription drugs (1974), iron preparations (1977),
acetaminophen (1980), and several other products. Each of these regulations is now administered by the CPSC.
These measures have aroused some controversy because individuals
without children-particularly many elderly with arthritis who find the
caps difficult to open-are forced to incur the inconvenience of safety
caps without reaping any benefits. Although such costs (plus those of
the caps themselves) may exceed any prospective benefits, one would
expect that the impact on safety should be favorable if consumer behavior
remains unchanged.
In practice, consumer behavior will not remain the same. In the case of
seat belts, for example, Peltzman showed that added seatbelt protection
diminished drivers' incentive to exercise care. 17 As indicated in the recent
critical review by Blomquist, the available empirical
evidence on auto
8
safety remains consistent with this hypothesis.'
In a companion paper, I show that safety caps will induce a "lulling
effect" on consumer behavior that comprises three components.' 9 First,
the presence of safety caps will diminish the expected safety gains to be
achieved by decreasing parental precautions regarding drugs. As a result,
parents will have less incentive to reduce children's access to drugs for
much the same reason that drivers protected by seat belts have less incen17 See Peltzman, supra note 2. In Viscusi, supra note 10, 1 generalize this result to the
worker safety context using quite flexible assumptions regarding preferences and incorporating the effects of the safety improvements on the wage rate. The spirit of Peltzman's
results holds in this situation as well.
1 See Blomquist, supra note 2.
'9 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Protective Bottlecaps on Aspirin and Analgesic Poisonings, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 324 (1984).
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tive to exercise care. This diminished responsibility could lead to a net
reduction in the safety level after the advent of protective caps, but the
conditions required for this to occur are quite stringent.20
A second type of influence arises because of the indivisibility of individuals' safety-related actions. Many safety precautions relating to pharmaceuticals affect a variety of products, not simply those with protective
caps. Parents may choose to keep drugs in a medicine chest, a kitchen
cabinet, on a bathroom shelf, in a safety-latched drawer, or in a purse. To
the extent that there is a spillover effect of the diminished responsibility
on other products, safety caps will increase poisoning rates for these
unprotected products. The net effect on safety will continue to tend to be
favorable, but the effect will be dampened by the consumer response.
One cannot, however, rule out a potentially counterproductive impact.
Finally, the regulation may induce consumer misperceptions regarding
the importance of precautions. Safety caps are routinely called "childproof" caps rather than "child-resistant" caps even by leading CPSC
officials. 2' In addition to the misperceptions regarding the safety implications of safety caps there may be an additional source of misperceptions
since safety caps will tend to reduce the size of the risk associated with
any particular level of precautions. To the extent that consumers tend to
ignore very-low-probability events, as some studies suggest, 22 consumers
may in turn dismiss these risks as unimportant. In each case, the result
will be a reduction in the degree of precautions to such a low level that the
net effect of the regulation may be counterproductive.
B.

The Impact on Aspirin Poisonings

The first major target of the protective packaging requirement was aspirin, which accounted for 8 percent of all accidental poisonings in 1972 and
17 percent of all poisonings from medicines. Manufacturers were not
required to use safety caps for all aspirin sold. The FDA exempted one
size from the regulation, and firms typically selected their best-selling size
(a 100 tablet bottle, for example) to be free of a safety cap.
The CPSC's statistical defense of the effectiveness of its safety cap
20 The principal condition is that for all levels of effort that lead to levels of risk above
those in the pre-safety cap situation, the marginal reduction in expected poisoning costs in
response to additional precautions must be sufficiently below the marginal effectiveness of
precautions in the pre-safety cap situation.
21 See, for example, the statement by Sam Zagoria, CPSC Commissioner, Washington
Post, November 14, 1983, at A15.
22 See Howard Kunreuther et al., Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons
(1978).
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requirements focuses on total poisonings rather than the poisoning rate,
thus ignoring the decline in the high-risk population group during the
1970s.2 3 Nevertheless, even the poisoning rate trend followed the pattern
one would expect from an effective regulation. The fatal poisoning rate
declined from 2.6 per million children under five in 1971 to a rate of 0.6 by
1980. Similarly, overall aspirin poisonings leading to hospital emergency
room treatment dropped from 5.0 to 1.7 per thousand children under the
age of five.
These declines need not imply that the regulation was effective. Aspirin's share of the pain reliever market has diminished as acetaminophen
products, such as Tylenol, have assumed a greater role. In addition,
almost all accident trends have declined throughout this century as society has become richer.
To isolate the influence of the protective packaging requirements, I will
use a regression in the same spirit as equation (I), but with some
modifications. The aspirin poisoning rate for children under five (PR5,) is
the dependent variable, and the explanatory variables include the lagged
dependent variable (PR5, 1), real per capita (PCC), and a regulatory
dummy variable (CPSC), which takes on a value of one beginning in 1972.
In addition, I will include an alternative measure of regulatory effectiveness-the fraction of aspirin sold with safety caps (SAFETYCAPS)in some of the regressions. Because of the rise of acetaminophen products
in the 1970s, there was a downward shift in the trend in aspirin sales. To
control for changes in the exposure to aspirin, each regression will include
one of three measures: the deflated or real value per capita of aspirin sales
(RSALES), total aspirin tablets produced per capita (PROD), and total
aspirin tablets sold per capita (SALES).2 4 In all, there were six different
equations to be estimated.
Table 6 reports the death-rate results for the 1963-80 period and Table 7
reports the overall poisoning rate results for the same period. The results
are consistently similar in each case. There is the expected positive lagged
influence of PR5, 1 on the current poisoning rate. Moreover, as society's
23 See Alisone Clarke & William Walton, The Effect of Safety Packaging on Children's

Aspirin Ingestions (internal report, Consumer Product Safety Comm'n 1978), and the U.S.
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Poison Prevention Packaging Act, Summary Report
(1983).
24 The data shift variables (for example, D4) were omitted for the Poison Control Center
data since these nonfatal-isk data are not subject to the international disease classifications.
In the case of the fatal poisoning rate equations, the shift terms are not statistically
significant. Sales of these drugs will be affected by the perceived risk of the product. Since
there is a two-year lag in the compilation and release of CPSC accident statistics, in the
absence of a major catastrophe (for example, toxic shock syndrome from tampons) the
effect of the product risk on consumption is likely to be recursive rather than simultaneous.
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TABLE 6
(under Five Years),

ASPIRIN POISONING DEATH RATE

REGRESSION RESULTS,

1963-80

COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS

1

2

3

4

5

6

16.92
(5.65)
.408
(.204)
-. 003
(.001)
-. 224
(.524)
...

9.58
(4.36)
.489
(.221)
- .002
(.001)
.191
(.553)
...
...
...

9.68
(4.28)
.450
(.249)
- .003
(.001)
.305
(.538)

9.50
(4.38)
.483
(.225)
- .002
(.001)
...

9.31
(4.23)
.456
(.251)
- .002
(.001)

.100

.314
(.938)
...

023
... -.(.101)

..

17.67
(5.69)
.382
(.205)
- .003
(.001)
...
...
- .677
(.907)
-. 017
(.008)
...

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Intercept
PRS,

I

PCC
CPSC
SAFETYCAPS

-'.016
(.009)
...

RSALES
PROD
SALES

...
..
9

2

R
R.96

2.49

D-W

...
...
...
...

...
..
9

.037
(.102)

.95
1.91

.95
1.83

(.979)
...
...
- .032

... (.102)

..

...
...
.695

.028
(.103)

...
...

.96
2.58

.95
1.84

.95
1.95

TABLE 7
1963-80

ASPIRIN POISONING RATE (under Five Years), REGRESSION RESULTS,

COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

Intercept
PRS,..
PCC
CPSC
SAFETYCAPS
RSALES
PROD
SALES
R2
D-W

I

2

3

4

5

6

897.5
(1,157.5)
.732
(.330)
-. 194
(.176)
-25.3
(99.5)
...

819.6
(335.9)
.734
(.180)
-. 167
(.088)
-28.3
(96.3)
...

627.5
(292.4)
.707
(.140)
-. 195
(.085)
9.7
(98.6)
...
...
...
...
...
...
15.1
(13.6)
.92
1.87

861.1
(1,133.9)
.713
(.322)
-. 183
(.169)
...

810.6
(326.7)
.723
(.176)
-. 158
(.084)
...

618.5
(289.2)
.694
(.139)
-. 185
(.081)
...

-78.1
(163.)
...

-9.74
(169.0)
...
...
...
...
14.4
(13.7)
.92
1.87

-. 435

...

(3.321)
...
...
...

-7.33
(19.35)
...

.92
1.65

...

.92
1.63

...

-71.0
(167.0)
- .364
(3.277)
...
...

...
. ...
.92
1.66
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...

-7.83
(19.28)
...
.89
1.66
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wealth has risen, the poisoning rate has exhibited the expected decline.
Except in the case of the RSALES variable, in the death-rate equation,
the aspirin-use variable did not play a significant role. In that case the
variable had a negative sign, which is the opposite of what one would
expect. Since the tablet-based measures (PROD and SALES) fail to show
a similar negative effect and appear preferable, in that they avoid the
distorting effect of changes in the price level, this negative result appears
to be an aberration.
The choice of the regulation variable is not consequential since there is
no evidence of any significant shift in poisoning rates after the advent of
the safety cap requirement. These results are also not sensitive to the
aspirin-use variable that is employed. The regression results consequently
offer no support for the hypothesis that CPSC safety cap regulations had a
statistically significant favorable effect on poisonings.
In the case of the aspirin death results, four of the six regulation
coefficients are positive. More favorable results for safety caps appear in
Table 7, where the largest mean impact of the regulation is for equation
(5), where the safety cap effect represents roughly 9 percent of the average home accident rate over the sample period. This impact cannot be
distinguished statistically from the no effect hypothesis, and the overall
magnitude of any potential impact of safety caps appears to be modest.
One possible explanation for the lack of effectiveness is that consumers
may have purchased those bottle sizes that did not have safety caps so
that it is conceivable that almost all poisonings were from unprotected
bottles. This possibility can be ruled out on inspection of the data in Table
8 for aspirin and for aspirin and analgesics combined. Just over half of all
aspirin sold was in safety cap bottles. 25 This figure did not change substantially during the 1970-78 period for which detailed poisoning data are
available. In contrast, the safety cap share of poisonings rose from 40
percent in 1972 to 73 percent in 1978. Not only are safety cap bottles not
risk free, but they account for a majority of all aspirin poisonings. Indeed,
a disproportionate share of poisonings are linked to safety caps. This
result may not imply that safety cap bottles are more risky since parents
with children may buy the safety-capped containers more often than consumers not in the high-risk group. Safety cap bottles may be better
matched to parents with children, but this event has not had a beneficial
effect on safety.
Of particular interest is the data series on the share of open bottles
involved in the poisonings. Although these data are not available for
25 These figures were based on sales data for five leading aspirin products: Bayer aspirin,
St. Joseph's aspirin for children, Bufferin, Excedrin, and Anacin.
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bottle types (that is, for whether it was a safety cap bottle) it is noteworthy that over two-fifths of all aspirin poisonings are from open bottles. In
the case of an open container, a safety cap will serve no useful function.
Some open-bottle poisonings occur while the parent is administering the
aspirin to the child and leaves the bottle unattended. The presence of
open aspirin bottles also may be related to the difficulties consumers have
in opening these protective caps. Consumers may leave the bottles open
rather than grapple with caps that they find difficult to open. There is
some evidence in support of this possibility since the rise in safety cap
poisonings has been accompanied by. an increase in the role of open
bottles.
The evidence on aspirin poisonings is consistent with a lulling effect on
consumer behavior. Safety cap bottles accounted for a sizable share of
poisonings, and many of these bottles were left open. The net effect was
that there is no evidence of a favorable impact on aspirin poisonings. If
this were the full effect of the regulation, the outcome would not be
greatly different from what has been observed in the seat belt case. The
principal difference is that the data on the role of safety caps and open
bottles enable us to address the mechanisms of influence more directly.
C.

The Effect on Analgesic Poisonings

The distinctive feature of these safety effects is the presence of a spillover effect on analgesic poisonings. Analgesic poisonings from products
such as Tylenol rose from 1. 1 per 1,000 children under five to a rate of 1.5
per 1,000 in 1980. Since this upward shift may be attributable to other
factors, such as increased sales, once again it is desirable to isolate such
influences statistically. The variables included in the analgesic poisoning
rate equations reported in Table 9 are similar to those in the aspirin
regression equations. One principal difference is that the CPSC variable
takes on a value of one only in 1980, the year in which the safety cap
requirement was extended to acetaminophen products. The hypothesis
that the lulling effect from protective bottle caps on aspirin had a spillover
effect on analgesics will be captured by the dummy variable UNREG,
which takes on a value of one during the 1972-79 period. If bottle caps
had such a spillover effect, this variable should have a positive sign.
The overall fit of the equation is quite good, but the nonregulatory
variables do not perform as well as in the aspirin equation. The lagged
poisoning rate has the expected positive effect on current poisonings, but
this variable is not statistically significant once the sales variables are
included. The difficulty is that PR, 1 is strongly correlated with RSALES,
PROD, and SALES. Real per capita consumption also has a positive
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ANALGESIC POISONING RATE

TABLE 9
(under Five Years),

REGRESSION RESULTS,

1963-80

COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1

Intercept

- 160.6

(59.8)
.388
(.293)
.076
(.025)
-2.16
(15.43)
22.33
(9.70)
...

PR5,_
PCC
CPSC
UNREG
RSALES

PROD
SALES
R2
D-W

2
-162.4

(62.7)
-. 003
(.356)
.077
(.027)
-1.97
(16.05)
23.70
(11.75)
.041
(.182)

3
- 146.0

(58.7)
.022
(.283)
.069
(.025)
-5.73
(15.13)
21.46
(9.39)
......
2.61

...

(1.88)
...

.97
1.84

.97
1.86

-154.7

(58.2)
- .025
(.288)
.073
(.025)
-4.66
(15.07)
23.56
(9.45)
...

.....

...

4

.97
2.10

...

2.73
(2.02)
.97
2.00

effect, which is not what one would expect if PCC captured the wealth
effect on safety alone. 26 This trend variable also may reflect any temporally related diminution in consumer responsibility toward access to such
medicines.
The two central variables of interest are the regulatory variables. As in
the aspirin case, the CPSC variable does not pass the usual tests of statistical significance. The magnitude of the coefficient is also not great, as it
never exceeds a 5 percent drop in the mean poisoning rate over the
sample period. The UNREG variable, however, reflects a powerful upward shift in the poisoning rate by almost one-fifth, which easily passes
the usual tests of statistical significance. This effect is remarkably robust
and is not greatly altered by the inclusion of analgesic sales variables.
After the advent of protective caps on aspirin there was an upward shift in
analgesic poisoning rates for children under five that cannot be explained
by poisoning rate trends, changes in wealth, or increases in analgesic
sales.
The absolute magnitude of the post-safety cap shift is quite substantial.
These results imply that 47 percent of the increase in analgesic poisoning
26 The PCC variable continues to have a positive sign even if the per capita sales variable

is omitted from the equation.
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rates between 1971 and 1980 was due to the role of UNREG. Overall, this
effect represents 3,500 additional analgesic poisonings of children under
five annually. As in all such assessments of the impact of risk regulation,
it cannot be ascertained whether this shift arose because of safety caps or
some other factor correlated with this policy and not included in the
equation. One such possibility is that parents with young children shifted
from aspirin to Tylenol and other acetaminophen products, thus generating a higher-risk consumer group than before. Consumer self-selection of
this type should, however, lower the risk from aspirin poisonings, and no
such decline was observed.
The net effect of the shifts in aspirin and analgesic poisoning rates after
the advent of safety caps is adverse. The overall behavior pattern is
consistent with what would occur if safety caps led to a decrease in
parental caution with respect to access to drugs. Because of the indivisibility of certain types of safety precautions, there was an adverse effect
on analgesic poisonings since these products were not initially covered by
the safety cap requirements.
D.

Overall Effect on Poisonings

If safety caps reduced other types of poisonings so that these adverse
effects were restricted to aspirin and analgesics, one might question
whether these findings were the result of some factor other than changes
in consumer behavior. To explore this possibility more fully, we will
analyze poisoning data for a wide variety of regulated products. These
product groups are listed in Table 10. In each case, a CPSC dummy
variable was created to match the particular year in which this product
came under a protective packaging requirement. (These years were summarized at the start of Section III.) The UNREG variable for a product
took on a value of one for all years after which part of the general product
class came under regulation, before the particular product became subject
to a safety cap requirement. This starting point was always 1972 since
internal medicines and cleaning and polishing agents both came under
regulation in that year.
The first two sets of results are for product groups. These results were
based on pooled time series and cross-section regression of the general
form as equation one except that category-specific intercepts for particular products within the group were included, and data shift terms were
omitted because they were not pertinent to Poison Control Center data. In
the case of prescription drugs, for which the total sample included 336
observations, the advent of the caps had no significant effect on the
poisoning trend; but there had been an earlier increase in 1972 and 1973 as
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TABLE 10
POISONING RATE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR PRODUCT GROUPS,

1968-80

COEFFICIENTS AND
STANDARD ERRORS
PRODUCT CATEGORY

Pooled product groups:
Prescription drugs

CPSC

UNREG

- .083

.987
(.550)
35.52
(17.07)

(.621)
Unregulated internal medicines
Single products:
Baby aspirin
Adult aspirin
Aspirin, unspecified
Analgesics
Barbiturate sedatives
Nonbarbiturate sedatives
Internal antibiotics
Psychopharmocological agents
Iron preparations
Hormones
Cardiovascular drugs
Amphetamines
Miscellaneous internal medicines
Liquid polish or wax
Turpentine
Solvents and thinners

- .398

(8.560)
.932
(1.310)
.401
(1.210)
- .391
(1.878)
- .308
(.238)
.571
(.400)
1.501
(1.105)
.350
(3.000)
- 1.123
(.783)
1.424
(1.996)
-. 184
(.763)
- .814
(.702)
4.437
(3.139)
4.510
(1.729)
- .495
(.596)
.273
(1.803)

Unregulated cleaning and
polishing products
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2.247
(1.251)
-. 135
(.337)
.522
(.345)
2.345
(.770)
4.154
(2.849)
- .205
(.397)
2.540
(1.571)
.076
(1.484)
.468
(1.125)
5.576
(2.674)

33.15
(11.95)
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reflected in the positive UNREG variable. The poisoning rate of internal
medicines that were not subject to safety caps exhibited an alarming
increase. These products include cough medicines and other nonprescription drugs.
The bottom portion of Table 10 presents similar results for narrowly
defined product groups. In the case of aspirin, for which I found no
significant CPSC effect overall, there is also no evidence of effectiveness
for particular product groups such as baby aspirin. The only CPSC
coefficient that passes the usual tests of statistical significance is that for
liquid polish or wax, which reflected a small positive shift in the poisoning
rate trend. The UNREG variables for three drugs were both positive and
statistically significant: analgesics, internal antibiotics, and miscellaneous
internal medicines. There was an increase in poisonings for unregulated
cleaning and polishing agents of roughly the same magnitude as for unregulated internal medicines.
The general pattern is consistent with the more aggregative results.
There is no evidence of a downward shift in poisonings from regulated
products, but poisonings from several products escalated during the periods in which they were not covered by safety caps. Those products with
significant UNREG coefficients include: analgesics, internal antibiotics,
psychopharmacological agents, miscellaneous internal medicines, and unregulated cleaning and polishing agents.
The net effect was adverse. This evidence is broadly consistent with a
model in which there are indivisibilities in consumers' safety precautions,
so that the reduction in consumer precautions increased the risk from
unprotected bottles. Diminished parental responsibility included leaving
bottles uncapped. The strength of these effects suggests that there may
also have been some consumer misperception regarding the effectiveness
of the caps. Consumers may have dismissed the importance of the safety
problem because of the false assumption that these caps were -"child
proof."
IV.

ANALYSIS OF

CPSC

RISK DATA

Although the safety cap requirements were not effective in promoting
safety, other CPSC regulations may have had a beneficial effect that was
too small to be reflected in the aggregative data analyzed in Section II. To
address this possibility, I will focus on the CPSC's NEISS data, which
was used in Section II with respect to fire-related accidents. The CPSC
uses a sample of selected hospital emergency room admissions to generate national injury estimates for 1,000 specific product groups (for example, power sanders). Since the first complete calendar year for which
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such data are available is 1973, and in some cases later, this information
provides insight only into recent product safety trends.
Unlike most risk data series, the NEISS data have been the object of
considerable controversy. 27 The disputes have not focused on the validity
of the injury numbers but on their use. The fundamental objection is that
the CPSC bases its policies on trends in the total number of injuries
provided through the NEISS system rather than on a use-adjusted risk
level or, what is even more pertinent, on the overall merits of the regulation. This deficiency in the nature of the risk measure can be remedied by
putting the risk data in per capita terms, as are other leading risk data
series. In some cases I will adjust even more specifically for the extent of
use by, for example, calculating the number of bicycle injuries per bicycle
in use.
A second shortcoming is that narrowly defined product categories (such
as stepladders) pose small-sample problems and categorization problems
(for example, one can record a ladder-related accident under any one of
several product-related categories, such as ladders not specified or stepladders). I will avoid each of these difficulties by analyzing only broad
product groups.
I will begin with an analysis of three fire-related regulations promulgated under the Flammable Fabrics Act, which is now administered by
the CPSC. Although the analysis of two data series on fire-related deaths
in Section II failed to indicate any significant shift, specific product groups
may have had a more favorable response. The first product safety standard I will analyze is the CPSC mattress standard, for which Linneman
failed to find any evidence of a downward shift in the risk level during the
1974-77 period.2 8
The CPSC promulgated an early version of the standard in 1973 and the
current version in 1975.29 This flammability standard was performanceoriented in that it imposed, for example, maximum char length limits on
mattresses exposed to a lit cigarette. The per capita death risk from mattresses and bedding dropped by 30 percent since 1974.30 Table I1 sum27 Two discussions of these shortcomings are by Broussalian, supra note 6, and Viscusi.
supra note 6.
28 See Linneman, supra note 14.
29 C.F.R. § 1632 (1975).
"0 These data are more comprehensive than Linneman's, supra note 14, since burn and
smoke-inhalation deaths are both included, whereas Linneman's data were restricted to
burns only. If the mix of accidents is not changing, however, this difference should not be
consequential except insofar as the sample size of mattress-related accidents is a bit larger.
In the case of Linneman's study. 269 of the reported burns between 1965 and 1974 were
mattress related. The CPSC mattress death data I use pertain to an average of about 200
mattress or bedding deaths annually.
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TABLE II
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS OF

CPSC

REGULATIONS

REGULATED PERIOD AVERAGES
RISK CATEGORY

Mattress/bedding (deaths per 100,000)
Matches (injuries per 100,000)
Carpets and Rugs (injuries per 100.000)
Cribs (injuries per 1.000 births)
Bicycles (injuries per 1,000 bicycles in use)

Actual

Predicted

Difference

.89
2.98
14.69
2.81
7.88

1.02
2.91
7.39
2.66
6.05

-. 13
.07
7.30
.15
1.83

SOURCE.-Calculations by the author using unpublished NEISS data and data from the Bicycle Manufacturers Association and U.S. Bureau of the Census.

marizes average actual and predicted levels of the NEISS-based measure
of mattress-related death rates per 100,000 persons for the 1974-78 period
for which CPSC data are available. There was a 30 percent drop in the
death rate over this period, but at least some of this decline should be

expected because of the general increase in safety over time.
Using the equation for the NSC fire and burn death rates from Section

II and adjusting the scale appropriately, 3' we can forecast the predicted
rate of mattress deaths beginning in 1975, the year of the final standard.
The difference between actual and predicted mattress deaths is consistently negative, and the average difference represents about 12 percent of
initial death rates. One cannot rule out the possibility that a small shift has

occurred, particularly in view of the consistent negative signs involved. 32
An alternative possibility is that the causal factor is not improved mattres-

ses but a decline in cigarette smoking by adults in the mid-1970s, which
33
has reduced the major cause of mattress fires.
The risk pattern displayed in the period after the imposition of the

CPSC matchbook safety standard displays a similar downward trend.
This standard required that the friction be on the outside back cover or at
the bottom of the matchbook, that the matchbook remain closed without

31 In particular, I used the fire and burn death-rate equation estimated for the 1949-81

period for the entire population using NSC data. The scale of the equation was adjusted by
multiplying the predicted values by the ratio of the 1974 mattress-related death rate to the
overall NSC fire and death rate.
32 The pattern of these discrepancies was a bit uneven, with 1976 and 1978 representing
the largest differences. Presumably, the effect should be steadily increasing if the CPSC
standard were effective.
33 There was a 6 percent decline in the adult smoking population from 1974 to 1979. See
the U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1982-1983, at
123.
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external force, and that firms undertake adequate control. One would not
expect these measures to have a major effect on hospital emergency
admissions for matchbook-related injuries. The post-standard decline parallels the pattern one would expect on the basis of the overall fire and burn
trend and is in fact insignificantly higher than the predicted level. In
addition, the rising market share of butane lighters also should have contributed to a decline in match-related risks.
The most surprising of the fire-related product risk trends is that for
carpets and rugs. On December 30, 1975, the CPSC issued flammability
performance criteria for carpets that were intended to reduce fire-related
accidents associated with these products. 34 Although most carpet-related
accidents, such as falls, do not stem from flammability risks and are not
directly affected by the regulation, there is no reason a priori to believe
that these accidents will be influenced adversely by the standard.
The carpet-related injury rate has doubled from its preregulation level,
and the increase is more than double when compared with the trend one
could have expected based on home accident rate trends. An increase in
carpet sales is not the explanation, since annual sales declined in real
terms over that period. 35 The principal nonfire source of carpet accidents-falls-also does not appear to be responsible, since total deaths
from falls dropped by 16 percent from 1975-81.36
At least some of the upward shift may be due to changes in the NEISS
data base. In 1978, the year in which the carpet injury rate rose by onefourth, the CPSC changed its sample of hospitals and altered its method of
risk classification.3 7 The explanation only appears to account for part of
the shift. A more disturbing possibility is that the nature of the carpet
materials now in use may pose greater risks. Since these materials are
selected in part to comply with CPSC standards, it is surprising that the
CPSC has not addressed this emerging risk problem other than to note
38
that it merits "continuing attention."
The difference between actual and predicted risk levels for two well
known safety-related standards also provides little evidence of CPSC's
34 C.F.R. § 1630 (1975).

35 See U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 33, at 774-75 for nominal sales data for
floor coverings, which exhibited a rise of 5 percent from 1977 to 1980. The overall inflation
rate over that period was 36 percent.
36 National Safety Council, supra note I, at 84.
37 Multiple products could now be associated with any single accident. These changes
may have contributed to a substantial part of the increased hazard, but they do not explain
the jump that occurred in 1977, shortly after the standard took effect, or in 1980.
38 See the Flammable Fabrics Report included in the Consumer Product Safety Commission, Annual Report, Pt. 2 (1981).
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effectiveness. Along with safety caps, the CPSC crib standard ranks as
the most prominent CPSC regulation in terms of its perceived effectiveness by CPSC officials. Beginning in 1973, the CPSC required that
39
crib bars on full-sized cribs be spaced no farther than 21/8 inches apart.
This spacing requirement, which was intended to prevent babies' heads
from becoming lodged between the bars, was accompanied by more questionable provisions that were tantamount to a complete crib-design standard. For example, the CPSC required that cribs be 28 ± 5/8 inches wide
and 523/8 _ 5/8 inches long.
The frequency rate I constructed for crib injuries pertained to the risk
per 1,000 births, since these risks are most pertinent for very young
children. The average crib injury risk during the postregulation period is
about 10 percent lower than in 1973. This decline is, however, slightly less
than one would expect on the basis of the home accident rate trends that
were used to calculate the predicted risk level. 40
The final CPSC standard I will consider is the CPSC bicycle standard
issued in 1978.41 Although some features of the standard, such as the
reflector requirement, clearly may affect safety, this regulation also imposes meticulous design and road-test requirements that run to twentyfour pages in the Code of Federal Regulations. For example, the CPSC
requires that "control cables are greater than 6.4 mm (/4 inch) in diameter
and cable clamps made from material not thicker than 4.8 mm (3/16 inch)
may be attached to the top tube." The genesis of these meticulous requirements and the bicycle standard itself can be traced to the bicycle
industry's efforts to keep out cheap foreign imports that were making
inroads in U.S. markets. 42
Since bicycle use has been increasing in the past decade, ideally the risk
measure should reflect this change. The variable I constructed was the
number of bicycle injuries per bicycle in use. This variable does not,
however, take into account increased intensity of use. This greater intensity is apparently responsible both for the increase in bicycle accident
rates and an excess of actual risk levels over those predicted on the basis
of home accident rate trends. If there has been any beneficial effect of the
39 C.F.R. § 1508 (1973).
40 More specifically, I used the overall home accident rate equation for the 1949-81
period. The only years with risk levels below those predicted were 1975 and 1976. Presumably, such negative discrepancies should have occurred in more recent years if the standard
were effective since the fraction of CPSC-approved cribs in the stock of existing cribs will be
rising over time.
41 C.F.R. § 1512 (1978).
42 See Nina Cornell, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast, Safety Regulation in Setting National
Priorities: The Next Ten Years 457-504 (H. Owen & C. Schultze eds. 1976).
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CPSC standard, it is being obscured by these factors that boost injury
rates.
V.

CONCLUSION

Neither the aggregative data nor the CPSC's NEISS data on particular
products provide any clearcut evidence of a significant beneficial effect on
product safety from CPSC actions. If there is a beneficial effect of these
regulations, then it is too small to estimate reliably. Since the CPSC's
regulatory efforts address a small portion of the product safety problem
and in some cases bear only a tangential relationship to product safety,
this type of result accords with what one might expect.
A much more surprising result was the pattern displayed by poisoning
rates after the advent of safety caps. For those products covered by safety
caps, there was no downward shift in poisoning rates. This ineffectiveness appears to be attributable in part to increased parental irresponsibility, such as leaving the caps off bottles. This lulling effect in turn led to
a higher level of poisonings for related products not protected by the caps.
The more general ramification of these results is that technological
solutions to safety problems may induce a lulling effect on consumer
behavior. The safety benefits will be muted and perhaps more than offset
by the effect of the decreased efficacy of safety precautions, misperceptions regarding the risk-reducing impact of the regulation, and spillover
effects of reduced precautions with other products. Although the precise
contribution of the regulation cannot be distinguished from other shifts in
behavior that may have occurred in the 1970s, it is clear that individual
actions are an important component of the accident-generating process.
Failure to take such behavior into account will result in regulations that
may not have the intended effect.
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